The H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV), which is a Japanese unmanned cargo transfer spacecraft, will deliver supplies to the International Space Station (ISS). The first HTV will be launched in 2009 from the Tanegashima Space Center aboard an H-IIB launch vehicle with up to 6,000kg of supplies. HTV approaches to the ISS and the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS), known as Canadarm2, will grapple the HTV and berth it to the ISS. After the supplies, the HTV will then be loaded with waste materials and then separated from the ISS by SSRMS. HTV conducts departure sequence from ISS after release from SSRMS and reentry to the atmosphere. In this paper, technology of HTV automated Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) system is presented.
Introduction
The HTV is a logistic supply and waste disposal vehicle for the ISS developed by the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). The HTV is designed to be launched on a new Japanese launch vehicle H-IIB in the summer of 2009 as the first flight article to demonstrate the overall system performance, followed by yearly launches and rendezvous to the ISS for scheduled logistic supply and waste disposal.
Compared with the other re-supply vehicles, except for the Space Shuttle, the HTV is unique in its ability to carry cargo, which is exposed to the space environment, in addition to the cargo in pressurized carrier. This makes the HTV a critical re-supply vehicle considering the Shuttle retirement in 2010.
In the following sections, we will present the overview of the HTV system and operations, followed by more detailed description of the GN&C systems, safety consideration for rendezvous and trajectory design, redundancy architecture, and FDIR (fault detection, recovery and isolation).
HTV Mission Overview
The HTV is designed to be launched by the H-IIB launch vehicle from the JAXA Tanegashima Space Center (TNSC). After separation from the H-IIB, the HTV will continue rendezvous flight to the ISS using its own propulsion system based on the onboard flight algorithm and the ground control. Figure 1 shows the HTV mission operation overview and sequence from the launch to the re-entry.
After the launch, the HTV will be separated from the H-IIB at about 300km altitude and will continue the rendezvous flight to the ISS, whose altitude can range from 350km to 460km. During this phase, the HTV will use the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) for communication with the HTV Control Center in Tsukuba, and the Global Positioning System (GPS) for standalone navigation until it establishes the direct communication link with the ISS through the Proximity Communication System (PROX). Thereafter, the HTV will use the PROX link for primary communication and the GPS for relative navigation. The HTV will approach the ISS from its nadir direction during the final phase of rendezvous, called "R-bar approach". When HTV reaches about 10m below the ISS and once all the criteria are met for capture, HTV will go into a free drift mode during which all the translational and attitude control will be turned off. Then the ISS crew member will operate the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS) to physically grab the HTV for capture. Figure 2 shows the image of HTV capturing operation.
The HTV will then be translated and attached to the nadir port of the Node2 module Figure 3 . During the attached phase, all the pressurized/unpressurized cargo will be transferred to the ISS either by the crew members or by the ISS Robotics Systems. In turn, any disposable cargo will be loaded to the HTV for subsequent de-orbit, re-entry and eventual disposal. 
HTV Rendezvous Function
The HTV Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) system realizes rendezvous to ISS. After separation from the H-IIB launcher, GN&C system activates propulsion system and performs attitude control and orbital maneuvers. The GN&C system maintains HTV attitude and translation control using the RCS thrusters and Main Engine.
The HTV GN&C system consists of the Guidance and Control Computer (GCC), Abort Control Unit (ACU), Space Integrated GPS & INS (SIGI), Earth Sensor Assemblies (ESA), Rendezvous Sensor (RVS) and Valve Drive Electronics (VDEs). Figure 4 shows an overview of HTV GN&C components.
Rendezvous Flight Software (RVFS), which is installed on GCC, performs automatic flight management.
The main functions of the HTV GN&C system are; 1) GN&C for Rendezvous, Departure, and Reentry 2) Flight Management (Mode control, Event sequencer and Time system management) 3) Fault Detection, Isolation, and Reconfiguration (FDIR)
The HTV GN&C system also has the system support functions, such as FDIR for Propulsion System, Power Bus failure, communication with Data Handling (DH) System, and PROX Communication. GN&C also provides functions for propellant resource management and navigation light control function.
RVFS manages its mode, guidance method, navigation, and FDIR based on its flight mode sequencer. Mode transition is executed by both automatically or manually. For example, mode transition from "Capture Point Holding" to "Free Drift" initiates deactivation sequence which executes shut-down of propulsion system, inhibit translation/attitude control in guidance computer, and inhibit abort maneuver function. Mode transition from "Relative Approach" to "R-bar Approach" initiates navigation source switch-over from Relative GPS to RVS. RVFS generates velocity profile for R-bar approach, and inhibits FDIR for GPS navigation. Mode transition to "Abort" by commanding initiates abort maneuver sequence.
HTV utilized several navigation sensors; those are gyro, accelerometer, Earth horizon sensor, laser sensor, and GPS receiver.
SIGI is a COTS (Commercial Off the Shelf) based GN&C product and it obtains navigation and attitude knowledge. SIGI provides GPS raw measurement, filtered GPS navigation (Absolute GPS) solution, angular rate by Ring Laser Gyro, and Accelerometer measurement. SIGI is also installed on ISS Japanese Experimental Module (JEM) to realize GPS relative navigation. At the vicinity to the ISS, GPS raw measurement is transmitted to HTV via PROX communication and RVFS processes Relative GPS (RGPS) navigation.
Attitude control is realized with Gyro sensors with periodical alignment using the Earth Sensor (ESA) which measures the spacecraft orientation to the Earth horizontal line. Orbital maneuvers are performed by RVFS with GPS based navigation. HTV GN&C estimates its relative position and velocity to ISS based on Differential GPS or Relative GPS navigation. Onboard (RVFS) calculates delta-V and conduct maneuvers. Cut-off of maneuver is executed with velocity increment based on accelerometer measurement. JAXA calls this method as "Velocity Increment Cut-off (VIC)".
Laser guided navigation is utilized for the final approach along the ISS R-bar. RendezVous Sensor (RVS) provides Range and Line of Sight (LOS) angle measurement to the target reflector (LRR: Laser Radar Reflector) on ISS.
Fig. 4. HTV GN&C System Overview

Architecture of HTV GN&C
The redundancy architecture of HTV GN&C with failure detection and recovery features are linked to both mission safety and mission success. The HTV with GN&C functions satisfies one fail operational and two fail-safe criteria. Rendezvous Flight Software (RVFS) on Guidance Control Computer (GCC) CPU units performs guidance, navigation, and actuator control for ISS rendezvous, ISS departure, and reentry. GCC Input/Output Controller (IOC) also runs a software named IOC OBS (On Board Software), which can conduct abort maneuver and attitude control in case of GCC CPU failure. ACU is the last string of HTV guidance computer and its main function is conducting abort maneuver in case that both IOC failed. Attitude control capability by ACU is limited in Pitch and Yaw direction and it is available only during abort maneuver. JAXA applies a safety concept that all of thrusting function shall be inhibited after ACU abort because no other function can monitor the sanity of attitude control by ACU.
HTV GN&C function drives Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters and Main Engines (MEs) via Valve Drive Electronics (VDE). From safety requirement, the propulsion system has three strings for collision avoidance maneuver (CAM), RCS-A branch, RCS-B branch, and main thruster branch (both ME-A and ME-B). Main thruster branch is the last string and used when both of RCS branches are failed. Correspondence between GN&C and Propulsion system is;
Primary string is GCC IOC1 with VDE1-A, 14 RCS-A thrusters, and 4 MEs. Secondary string is GCC IOC2 with VDE1-B, 14 RCS-B thrusters, and 4 MEs. Tertiary string is ACU with VDE2, and 4 MEs.
At the vicinity to the ISS, only RCS is utilized for attitude and translational control. ME is utilized only for CAM and driven by ACU.
GCC and ACU are the fault tolerant computers and realize one fail operative and two fail safe. For HTV GN&C function, most likely hazard is "collision to the ISS". GCC and ACU are the key component to maintain the ISS safety. GCC has three identical Micro Processing Units (MPU's) with RVFS. IOS has one MPU and nominally it process just data interface and monitor status of CPU. Processes in each GCC CPU are identical and processing results are voted in GCC (IOC). The correct result is determined by majority voting (minimum 2 of 3).
Both GCC CPU with RVFS and GCC IOC with IOC OBS utilize NASDA TX49 MPU. Each MPU in CPU and IOC monitors the other and triggers the switch over function in case of detecting an error.
When one of GCC CPUs is failed, IOC masks erroneous CPU according to the 2 of 3 majority voting result. After then, masked CPU/RVFS is not activated by sequencer. In case of double CPU anomaly, IOC takes over the CPU and executes abort maneuver by its MPU processing. In case of primary IOC failure, GCC CPU detects it and switchover the IOC to redundant. In case of secondary IOC failure, GCC CPU switchover orbit and attitude control authority to the ACU and it immediately executes an abort maneuver to keep safe distance to ISS.
A schematic diagram of the GN&C is shown in Figure 5 . Verification of HTV GN&C system was completed in March 2008. HTV GN&C system was already installed on HTV proto-flight model and its compatibility with whole HTV system will be verified under integrated system environment test which will be conducted in 2008. 
Safety Consideration
A major requirement for the HTV GN&C function is to meet the safety requirements regarding the ISS. Those specific to the guidance control system include avoiding the collision to the ISS which may lead to loss of the ISS mission or life of the ISS crew member that is categorized as Catastrophic Hazard.
HTV Segment Specification (SSP-50273) follows the ISS Safety Requirements Document (SSP-50021). The general concepts are; i) Two Fault Tolerance for Catastrophic Hazard ii) Apply three inhibits on functions which could result in a catastrophic hazard if inadvertently operated iii) At least two monitors of the three inhibits iv) Monitor the function which requires operator action for safing in case of the loss of function v) Automatic initiation of collision avoidance maneuver prior to the catastrophic hazardous effect vi) Design for minimum risk where fault tolerance approach is not practical.
All HTV rendezvous system follows these requirements, except for power system. JAXA determined it is not practical for HTV to apply three independent power buses considering increasing of mass against its high reliability. HTV conducts collision avoidance maneuver immediately after RVFS detect failure in one of two power bus.
Requirements of Computer Based Control Safety-Systems (CBCS) and safe trajectory requirement are typical safety requirements on free flight vehicle. Detail of CBCS requirement and implementation is discussed in section 5.2. Safe trajectory consideration for HTV rendezvous is in section 5.3.
Hazard Analysis for HTV GN&C function
Hazard Analysis for HTV regarding ISS collision safety concluded there are three factors of possible cause, those are 1) Excessive delta-V at maneuver, 2) Insufficient delta-V at maneuver, and 3) Loss or degraded HTV control.
1) Generation of excessive delta-V at maneuver
Excessive maneuver than planned delta-V is possible cause of ISS collision. To implement counter function in Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery architecture, Detail cause is assessed. The following hazard causes related GN&C are identified.
• Inadequate thrusting commands by computer error 2) Insufficient delta-V at maneuver Insufficient maneuver to the planned delta-V is also a possible cause of ISS collision. The possible causes, which are related to the GN&C function, are identified as follows:
• Inadequate commands from GCC or VDE • Insufficient thrusting by mechanical failure of valve • Navigation sensor data error
• Loss of electric power • Propellant depletion 3) Loss or degraded HTV control close to ISS This failure factor is focused on the hazard at HTV capturing operation. At the operation which is conducted about 10m from ISS, even small dynamics error will be a possible hazard cause.
• HTV has at least two independent redundant strings for the function which identified as a possible and plausible catastrophic hazard cause. Three sets of computer and actuator string, three gyro sensors for attitude control and detecting disturbance, three accelerometer for maneuver cut-off control, and four strings of wireless communication.
Operational failure also can cause a collision hazard, for example, inadvertent execution of CAM will cause a hazard during capturing operation. For this kind of hazard, CBCS general design requirement is applied and mitigated that is discussed in section 5.2.
Application of CBCS requirement
General requirements of Computer Based Control Safety-Systems (CBCS) are applied for the free flying unmanned vehicle which rendezvous to ISS. CBCS general requirements are summarized as below;
• Safely initialize to safe state • Perform an orderly shut-down of a function • A processor shall continue to operate safely or contain design features under off-nominal power conditions • Commands out of sequence, which can cause a hazard, shall be rejected • Detect and recover from memory modification • Reject hazardous commands which do not meet prerequisite checks for execution Two major principles in CBCS are also applied on HTV GN&C system; those are Must Work Function (MWF) and Must Not work function (MNWF).
MWF is applied on CBCS whose inadvertent shut-down will cause a hazard. For example, loss of CAM functions during rendezvous. MNWF is applied on CBCS whose inadvertent operation would cause a hazard. A typical case is an inadvertent activation of CAM during capture operation.
Requirement for control function related MWF and MNWF are defined in SSP-50038 as "A computer based control section shall be designed such that no combinations of two failures, or two operator actions, or one of each will cause a catastrophic hazardous event."
Major requirement related HTV GN&C from MWF and MNWF are simplified as below: 1) MWF requirements;
• Apply two unique command to deactivate any function related failure tolerant capability • At least one independent operator action shall be required for each operator initiated command message used in the shutdown of a capability or function that could lead to a hazard • Separate/Protect redundant functional paths whose loss will results in the loss of the redundant functional path 2) MNWF requirements;
• Overrides or removal of inhibit shall require at least two independent actions by the operator • Need two independent commands to deactivate critical capabilities • Make available for the ISS crew and ground operators to monitor the status of inhibits • Separate control path for each inhibit used as a control • Alternate functional paths shall be separated for critical functions Typical MWF in HTV GN&C is attitude and translational control. Loss of those functions will put HTV into wrong trajectory, which could interfere with the ISS structure. A typical example for control on MWF is maneuver cut-off. Both over-burn (excessive delta-V) and under-burn (insufficient delta-V) can put HTV into collision trajectory. To avoid this hazard, maneuver cut-off must be conducted within appropriate delta-V generation. As a counter design to the over-burn, HTV has several inhibits in thrust driver control. For electric failure, in case RVFS detects over-burn by the accelerometer, RVFS conducts switch-over of thrust control. In the process of redundant thrust string activation, redundant system (IOC, VDE) conducts shut-down of formerly used string. This operation prevents erroneous delta-V generation by anomalous thrust control string, even if RVFS can't identify which part of string is wrong. Allocation of inhibit for thrust control is shown in Figure 6 . Three serial inhibits are applied on thruster valve drive. These inhibits cut-off the electric power supply to thruster valve. Latch valves (LV) for propellant and oxidant are closed when an anomaly in the thrusting control is identified during maneuver. In case the anomaly is mechanically open failure of thrusting valve, this operation can assure the stop of anomalous thrusting.
A MNWF in HTV GN&C is attitude and translational control capability "during capturing operation". HTV design must inhibit inadvertent execution of maneuver, especially CAM, during free drifting for SSRMS capturing because the maneuver possibly results in collision to SSRMS. As a counter method to the hazard cause, several independent inhibits are applied for thrusting function during free drift. Inhibit on thrust control prevents inadvertent drive signal to activate the thruster valves. For computer control, involatile memory is used to assure the status of "free drifting and inhibit thrusting". This can set the status on the redundant computer and act as counter to the inadvertent memory inversion by single event effect. Even in case of GCC failure during free drift, the status of thrusting cut-off mode is set in the ACU and no inadvertent CAM is conducted. • Nominal and free drift trajectories prior to the maneuver that takes HTV inside AE including 3 sigma dispersions shall stay outside of the AE for a minimum of 24 hours • The HTV shall have a CAM capability that shall place the HTV on a trajectory that will exit the AE and not reenter for at least 24 hours • A CAM that is initiated in the KOS shall begin with a positive opening rate with respect to the ISS until it exits the AE • HTV shall not get closer than 6 ft to any ISS structure, except for capture mechanisms and attachment points even in case of failed capture Safe free drift trajectory, which is trajectory after cut-off the translational control, is a basic requirement. Free drift trajectory assessment with Monte Carlo method is shows in the Figure 7 . HTV conducts HAM2, MC5, and AI maneuvers in a sequential order for approach to ISS and all translational control is inhibited after completion of AI maneuver. Actual HTV design has a capability of conducting an active CAM at the moment when HTV losses both primary and secondary control string caused by anomalies and it puts HTV into the safe trajectory pass far away from AE envelope. Alongside the CAM capability, free drift trajectory shall be also designed so that it must not get across the AE after any maneuver cut-off even HTV has a capability of CAM. HTV must be able to execute a CAM at any times for all mission phases. Trajectory after CAM must put the HTV on a 24 hour safe free drift trajectory.
Passive abort (PA) is a kind of CAM, but it doesn't apply any delta-V to HTV. PA initiates "cut-off all of translational control". PA is applied for several maneuver points far from ISS and yaw maneuver at 300m on R-bar. HTV conducts 180 degrees yaw maneuver to change the direction of active CAM at 300m on R-bar. Before arriving at 300m, CAM direction is set on "deceleration". During final approach from 300m to 10m point on R-bar, CAM direction is set on "acceleration". Because HTV Main Engine (ME), which is the third string for CAM", is installed on the tail of HTV, change of CAM direction requires 180 degrees of yaw maneuver. CAM with ME during yaw maneuver is not effective to maintain safe trajectory. Abort type is set as "PA" before initiating yaw maneuver. Trajectory after PA must satisfy the free drift requirement and it must not re-enter AE within 24 hours. Trajectory Assessment for PA at 300m on R-bar is shown in Fig. 8. (1) and Fig. 8. (2) . Assessment results shows free drift trajectory stays out of AE within 24 hours after PA. 
Conclusion
This paper focused on presenting HTV mission overview, HTV rendezvous function, safety consideration on HTV GN&C system and trajectory design, and implementation of safety function related to the ISS safety against collision.
Basic concept and application for HTV unmanned free flying vehicle regarding ISS safety requirement especially CBCS and free drift trajectory was presented.
